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COMMENT ON: “DO SUNSPOTS MATTER WHEN SPOT MARKET
 
EQUILIBRIA ARE UNIQUE?”
 
By Richard C. Barnett and Eric O’N. Fisher1 
Mas-Colell (1992) conjectured that there could be no sunspot equilibria if the fun­
damentals of the underlying economy admitted a unique equilibrium. Hens (2000) con­
structed an example to show that this conjecture was false. A weak form of Mas-Colell’s 
conjecture is indeed false, but there is an error in Hens’s proof. The ﬁrst part of this com­
ment shows the mistake in Hens’s argument, and the second part proves the existence 
of the relevant sunspot equilibria. We conclude with a discussion of why an example like 
Hens’s is necessary if one wishes to prove that a stricter form of Mas-Colell’s conjecture 
is indeed false. 
We follow Hens’s notation almost exactly. There are two sunspot-contingent assets 
paying returns denominated in units of the numeraire. These returns are 
  
0 1 
   V = b 0    
c 0 
where vsj is the return on asset j in state s. There are two households indexed by i ∈ 	1 2
, 
and in each state of nature there are two goods. The fundamentals of the economy are 
endowments 1 = 1 0′ and 2 = 0 1′ and preferences described by the composite 
function hi  ui  R2 → R. The function ui· has the rule uixi = x1i i x2i 1−i and hi·+ 
is assumed to be differentiable, strictly monotone, and concave. 
The probability that state s occurs is s, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected ∑3utility indicators are U ixi = s=1 shi  uixis. Let  ps = p1s p2s′ . Then, 
taking spot market prices p = p1′p2′p3′′ and asset prices q = q1 q2′ as given, 
each agent chooses a consumption plan xi ∈ R6 and asset demands yi ∈ R2 to maximize 
U ixi subject to q · yi ≤ 0 and, for s ∈ S = 	1 2
+ 
 3
 ps · xis ≤ ps · i + V syi, where 
V s  is row s of the asset return matrix V . An  equilibrium is a list of spot market prices p, 
asset prices q, and corresponding allocations xi2 and asset demands yi2 such that i=1 i=1 
xi and yi solve the household’s problem, i xis ≤ i i for s ∈ S, and i yi ≤ 0. The 
sunspot equilibrium is nontrivial if for some agent xis 
= xis′ for some s s′ ∈ S. 
Let vips wis be the indirect utility of agent i facing spot market prices ps and 
having ex post income wis = ps · i + V syi. Since each ex post spot market has a 
unique equilibrium, we can write his = hi  vips wis without ambiguity. For ease 
of exposition, we follow Hens and put h1· = h· h2· = g· 1 = , and 2 = . Using 
Hens’s four normalizations q2 = 1 and p2s = 1, we see that the asset demands imply      
q1h
′1/p11 −bh′2/p12 −ch′3/p13 1 0          q1g′1/p11 −bg′2/p12 −cg′3/p13 2 = 0       
1 1 1 3 1 
1 The authors thank Thorsten Hens for helpful comments. 
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Since expected utility is deﬁned up to an afﬁne transformation, we can always set 
q1h
′1/p11 = q1g′1/p11 = 1 and then write 
     
1 −bh′2/p12 −ch′3/p13 1 0          (1) 1 −bg′2/p12 −cg′3/p13 2 = 0       
1 1 1 3 1 
Write (1) as A = 0 0 1′; we are looking for a solution satisfying   0. Note that 
A−1 = 1/ det A 
  · · ·  · · ·  bc h′2/p12g′3/p13 − g′2/p12h′3/p13!    × · · ·  · · ·  −c h′3/p13 −g′3/p13!    
· · ·  · · ·  b h′2/p12 −g′2/p12! 
Since  =A−10 0 1′   0 only if all the elements in the last column of A−1 have the 
same sign. 
Hens sets y1
1 = −1  = 1/4  = 1/2 −1 < b <  0, and 1 > q1 > c >  0. These 
assumptions imply that p11 = 2 − q1/3p12 = b + 2/3, and p13 = c + 2/3. 
Since b q1 c  ∈ −1 1, p11 ∈ 1/3 2/3 p12 ∈ 1/3 2/3, and p13 ∈ 2/3 1. Thus 
p12 < p13 and p11 < p13. The normalizations imply that state-dependent indi­
rect utilities are v1ps w1s =1−1−w1s/p1s and v2ps w2s =1− 
1−w2s/p1s . Note that w11/p11 = 2/31 + q1/p11w12/p12 = 
2/31 −b/p12, and w13/p13 = 2/31 − c/p13. Also, w21/p11 = 1 − 
q1/p11 , w22/p12 = 1 + b/p12, and w23/p13 = 1 + c/p13. Compu­
tation shows that w11/p11 > w13/p13 and w12/p12 > w13/p13 and 
also that w21/p11 < w23/p13 and w22/p12 < w23/p13 . Since g· 
and h· are both strictly increasing and concave, 0 < h′1 ≤ h′3 0 < h′2 ≤ h′3, 
g′1 ≥ g′3 >  0, and g′2 ≥ g′3 >  0. 
If all three elements in that column are negative, then in particular the ﬁrst one 
is. Since bc < 0, h′2/p12g′3/p13 > g′2/p12h′3/p13 and thus 
h′2g′3/h′3g′2 > p13−/p12− > 1, contradicting that h′2g′3/h′3g′2 ≤ 
1. If all three elements in that column are positive, then in particular the second one 
is. Since c >  0, h′3/p13 < g′3/p13 and thus h′3/g′3 <  1/p13− . Since 
we have imposed that q1h′1/p11 = q1g′1/p11 = 1 g′1/h′1 = p11− and 
thus h′3g′1/g′3h′1 < p11−/p13− < 1, where the last inequality follows from 
p11 < p13. But this contradicts the fact that h′3g′1/g′3h′1 ≥ 1. Thus Hens’s 
example is incorrect. 
Where exactly did Hens go wrong? Like us, he uses the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions 
characterizing the two agents’ asset demands to form a linear system in the probabili­
ties of the sunspot states. Solving the system, he establishes three restrictions on some 
auxiliary functions that ensure that the probability of each state is strictly positive. His 
proof is constructive, and he attempts to show the existence of strictly concave functions 
that satisfy a system of inequalities. He actually relies on piecewise linear approximations 
to more general concave functions. Using these approximations, he describes properties 
of the auxiliary functions ((i)–(v) of Hens (2000)) that he says sufﬁce for the requisite 
inequalities to hold. Unfortunately, his ﬁve conditions do not imply his original inequali­
ties. In particular, condition (v) is not strong enough. 
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We will now construct an equilibrium where sunspots matter. The matrix for sunspot-
contingent asset payoffs is 
  
1 1 
   V = 1 0    
0 1 
For simplicity, we impose that 1 = 2 = 3 = 1/3 and use the same normalizations 
as before. Let endowments again be 1 = 1 0′ and 2 = 0 1′. Preferences are now 
represented by u1x1 = x111/2x211/2 and u2x2 = x121/2x221/2, with h1u = u and 
h2u = u. Now the spot prices are p1s = 1 for all s ∈ S.2 Since the indirect utility 
functions for the two agents are identical, the asset demand conditions show that q1 = 1. 
Now consider either agent’s problem. He takes prices as given and chooses yi to max­
imize expected utility subject to q1y1 
i + y2 i ≤ 0. Since q1 = 1, it is easy to see that any 
0 ≤ y1 i ≤ 1 maximizes expected utility and satisﬁes the nonnegativity constraints. If y1 i =
 0, 
then sunspots matter because the equilibrium allocations are random, even though the 
supporting prices are not. Since each agent’s ex ante expected utility is unchanged, these 
equilibria are quite trivial. It is still an open question whether this admittedly simple 
example can be extended to the case where the agents are strictly risk averse and have 
preferences that are not identical and homothetic. 
We conclude by arguing that the following four conditions are necessary for Mas­
Colell’s conjecture to be false in economies where spot prices differ across sunspot real­
izations and where agents are risk averse. First, there must be at least two agents so that 
there can be some ex ante asset trade. Second, there must be at least two assets for exactly 
the same reason. Third, there must be at least three states of nature so that markets are 
actually incomplete, and Cass and Shell’s (1983) classic result about full insurance is not 
germane. Fourth, there must be at least two goods in each spot market, since otherwise 
no risk-averse agent would hold a strictly positive amount of any asset even if it were 
priced at fair odds. 
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